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DIGNITY CONTRADICTIONS: RECONSTRUCTION AS
RESTORATION
TAJA-NIA Y. HENDERSON
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1867, in Rutherford County, Tennessee, W.H. Tilford initiated a legal action against Stephen Tilford (a former slave) to have Stephen declared legally insane. 1 Records from the case indicate that Stephen had
been “charged with lunacy.” 2 Writing about the case, J.K. Nelson, an agent
with the federal Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands,
commonly known as the Freedmen’s Bureau, noted that Stephen Tilford
was neither “an idiot or lunatic or a man of unsound mind.” 3 To the contrary, Stephen Tilford was (and had been all his life) a deaf-mute: W.H. Tilford had, in effect, held out Stephen’s inability to speak (his physical
disability) as proof of his alleged feeble-mindedness. Tilford’s strategy was
successful. A Rutherford County jury found that Stephen was insane, and
the court ordered him remanded into Tilford’s custody for the purpose of
working on Tilford’s farm. 4
Surviving Freedmen’s Bureau records indicate that, prior to emancipation, Stephen had been enslaved as the property of Tilford’s family; that the
man had a reputation as “one of the best farm hands in Rutherford County”;
and that, after emancipation, Stephen had stayed on with the family—
”laboring hard” without pay—until late 1866, when he quit the farm to live
with his own extended family. 5 It was this decision—to quit the farm and
deprive the Tilfords of his labor—that catalyzed the sequence of events
Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School. The usual thanks go out to the editors of the Chicago-Kent
Law Review and Professor Bernadette Atuahene for their expert editing of this Essay.
1. Reports of Outrages, Riots and Murders, Jan. 15, 1866–Aug. 12, 1868, Records of the Assistant Commissioner for the State of Tennessee, Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, & Abandoned Lands,
1865–1869, microformed on M999, Roll 34 (National Archives Microfilm Publications),
http://www.freedmensbureau.com/tennessee/outrages/tennoutrages2.htm
[https://perma.cc/NM98J2A8].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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resulting in Stephen being subjected to a court-ordered confiscation of his
labor (for a period of one year). He was, in effect, sentenced by the Rutherford County Court to be the Tilfords’ slave—two years after the passage of
the constitutional amendment abolishing slavery. 6
When the Freedmen’s Bureau inquired whether Stephen would like to
return to the Tilfords to work for wages, the deaf-mute man used his index
finger to draw a slicing sign across his neck. 7 Employing a universallyunderstood signal, Stephen communicated that he’d rather “cut his [own]
throat” than return to the dominion of his former owners. 8 Stephen’s sign
for suicide motivated the local Bureau field agent to become involved in
his case. In contemporaneous reports of the incident, the agent expressed
disgust at the efforts of the Tilford family to steal Stephen’s labor without
paying him a wage, 9 and considered whether the federal government
should seek to use military force to free Stephen from the custody of the
Tilfords. In large part due to the efforts of the local Bureau agent, Stephen
was eventually released into the custody of his own family and allowed to
quit the Tilfords for good. 10
The saga of Stephen Tilford reminds us that the labor and wage theft
that was central to the institution of American chattel slavery did not cease
with emancipation. In its place, emerged a system of purported “free labor”
which bound freedpeople to the soil, restricted their movement, and kept
them indebted, all at the risk of extreme violence (whether administered by
the state or private parties). This Essay considers the utility of Bernadette
Atuahene’s theory of dignity takings and dignity restoration in the context
of American chattel slavery, emancipation, and Reconstruction. Here, I
take up the challenge posed by Atuahene at the end of Chapter 1 to “explore whether the concept of dignity takings helps us to better understand”
property atrocities in the United States, namely, the systematic dispossession of black property rights in labor under slavery, Reconstruction and Jim
Crow. Using slavery’s dismantling—specifically, emancipation and Reconstruction (including the ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments)—
as a qualitative case study, this Essay considers whether (and if so, how)
Reconstruction functioned to restore dignity to formerly enslaved persons. I
begin with the premise that American chattel slavery easily fits Atuahene’s
theorization of dignity takings. According to Atuahene, “[a] dignity taking
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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occurs when a state directly or indirectly destroys or confiscates property
rights from owners or occupiers and the intentional or unintentional outcome is dehumanization or infantilization.” 11 Concomitantly, dignity restoration “is a remedy that seeks to provide dispossessed individuals and
communities with material compensation through processes that affirm
their humanity and reinforce their agency.” 12 The question I ask, however,
is whether dignity takings and dignity restoration are clarifying lenses
through which to consider the persistent harms of slavery and racialized
subjugation. Using government policy in the immediate wake of the Civil
War (specifically, the work of the Freedmen’s Bureau) as an example, I
argue that remedial initiatives in the wake of racially-motivated property
atrocities may function simultaneously as both dignity restoration and dignity extraction. The resultant “dignity contradiction” suggests that property
deprivation (in this case, the expropriation of labor) may not bring “conceptual clarity” 13 to efforts to craft compensatory regimes for the harms
attendant to an entrenched slave regime. It may even be the case, as Dirk
Hartog argued in his comment on coverture, that “the language of dignity
and of dignity takings stands in the way of the project of finding redress for
those distinctive and continuing wrongs.” 14
As a federal agency backed by the military might of the federal government, the Freedmen’s Bureau stood in the gap for those freedpeople,
like Stephen Tilford, who had been subjected to the “forced illiteracy” 15 of
the slave regime. Throughout the South, agents of the Bureau oversaw the
resettlement of abandoned lands, investigated (and, in some cases, adjudicated) the civil and criminal complaints of freedmen and women, assisted
with the reunification of black families, disbursed military bounties and
pensions, negotiated labor agreements, and (as laid bare in the case of Stephen Tilford) acted as advocates both in, and outside of, court for the labor
and property rights and bodily integrity of formerly enslaved persons. Bureau agents acted as intermediaries tying the fate of the freedpeople to an
arm of the federal government. This disruption of wide-scale labor theft
11. Bernadette Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration: Creating a New Theoretical
Framework for Understanding Involuntary Property Loss and the Remedies Required, 41 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 796, 817 (2016) [hereinafter Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration]; see also
Bernadette Atuahene, Takings as a Sociolegal Concept: An Interdisciplinary Examination of Involuntary Property Loss, 12 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 171, 178 (2016).
12. Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration, supra note 11, at 818.
13. Id.
14. Hendrik Hartog, Coverture and Dignity: A Comment, 41 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 833, 833
(2016).
15. CHRISTOPHER HAGER, WORD BY WORD: EMANCIPATION AND THE ACT OF WRITING 33
(2013).
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and anti-black violence had clear dignity restoration intents and effects. As
one author notes, “[i]n many cases the Freedmen’s Bureau offered the former slaves the first real protection ever allowed them before the law.” 16
Simultaneously, Bureau personnel often acted against the attempts of
freedpeople to exercise autonomy over their bodies or their labor. Bureau
agents sided with planters, declined to investigate complaints of anti-black
violence, withheld material support from defiant or unruly freedpeople, and
encouraged (or more accurately, coerced) freedpeople to recommit their
labor to the cultivation of cotton. The chronic inadequacy of Bureau resources in some jurisdictions meant that “the needs and wants of the
freedmen” in those states invariably went unaddressed or ignored. 17 By
tying freedpeople to the land, the Bureau limited mobility, depressed wages, enriched planters, and helped cement a permanent underclass or “subclass” of black agricultural workers in the region. 18 By these acts, the
Freedmen’s Bureau presented a dignity contradiction—acting in its official
government capacity to simultaneously perform both dignity extraction and
dignity restoration. 19
Part I of this Essay argues that chattel slavery was a dignity taking
warranting restoration. Part II presents a historical sketch of the major elements of Reconstruction-era federal policy from 1865–1873, with special
emphasis on the Freedmen’s Bureau. Part III argues that the Bureau had
clear dignity restoration and dignity extraction properties. As the state’s
interest in remedying the wage theft endemic to chattel slavery yielded to a
policy of transforming formerly enslaved persons into disciplined wage
workers in order to protect regional economic interests, the possibilities for
redress for this particularized harm necessarily became constrained. The
resulting dignity contradiction suggests that the conceptual framework of
dignitary property may not be ideally suited for examining the harms attendant to chattel slavery and its legacy.

16. JOHN DAVID SMITH, BLACK VOICES FROM RECONSTRUCTION, 1865–1877, at 63 (1997).
17. MARTIN ABBOTT, THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU IN SOUTH CAROLINA, 1865–1872, at 20–21
(1967); see also id. at 20 (“[T]here were several counties of [South Carolina] in which, a full year after
the Bureau had begun to operate, the freedmen has never seen or felt its presence.”).
18. Id. at 76 (“No matter how hard they worked, during Reconstruction most blacks remained
landless, poor, undereducated, and subject to white control.”).
19. As noted by Atuahene, “acts or institutions can be simultaneously dignity degrading and
dignity enhancing.” Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration, supra note 11, at 817.
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II. CHATTEL SLAVERY AS A DIGNITY TAKING
Before considering how the dismantling of American chattel slavery
fits within Atuahene’s theory of dignity restoration, it is necessary to clarify how chattel slavery itself effected a “taking.”
A. Labor as Property
Although governmental seizures of land and other real property form
the target for the archetypal exercise of eminent domain, the takings clause
of the Fifth Amendment is not limited to interests in land. Government
appropriation of personal property is similarly subject to the Amendment’s
limitations. The U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle in 2015’s
Horne v. Department of Agriculture, noting that the state “has a categorical
duty to pay just compensation when it takes your car, just as when it takes
your home.” 20 This principal also holds true for labor, as state and federal
courts have consistently acknowledged. 21 Labor is property.
The philosopher most associated with the proprietary theory of labor
is John Locke. In the Second Treatise of Government, Locke argued the
centrality of labor to property acquisition. Since, according to Locke, labor
was “the unquestionable property of the labourer,” 22 then whatever the
laborer produced, so too, was the laborer’s “unquestionable property.” By
Locke’s reasoning, labor (the “work of his hands”) did not merely belong
to the laborer, but also belonged to him exclusively. 23 Among society’s
various groups, disadvantaged landless persons (those for whom “there is
not then enough and as good land left” 24) have a special interest in labor as
property. 25 In the absence of land or capital, labor offers a property of last

20. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2422 (2015).
21. See infra notes 26–28 and accompanying text.
22. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 27
(C.B. Macpherson ed., 1980) (1690), http://www.gutenberg.org/files/7370/7370-h/7370-h.htm
[https://perma.cc/7P22-KUXM].
23. Id. (“[E]very man has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to but himself.
The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his.”). Thomas Jefferson
believed that the right to one’s labor was among the natural rights of man. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to James Madison (Oct. 28, 1785), in 2 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 292
(Samuel Eagle Forman ed., 1900) (referring to the right to “labor the earth” as “fundamental.”).
24. C. B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM 212 (1962)
(cited in Francis A. Citera, Vested Seniority Rights: A Conceptual Approach, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 751,
759–60 n.50 (1982)).
25. LOCKE, supra note 22, § 27; see JOHN LOCKE, THE FIRST TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, in
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 42 (C. & J. Rivington 1824) (1691) (“Charity gives every Man a
title to so much out of another’s Plenty, as will keep him from extreme want, where he has no means to
subsist otherwise . . . .”).
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UHVRUW IRU WKH SRRU  7KLV SUHPLVH²WKDW ODERU LV SURSHUW\²LV ZLGHO\ DF
FHSWHGDVDQRUPDWLYHIRXQGDWLRQDOSULQFLSOHE\OHJLVODWXUHV  FRXUWV  DQG
VFKRODUV 
B. Chattel Slavery as a Dignity Taking
7KLV LQFOXVLRQ RI ODERU LQWR WKH XQLYHUVH RI SURSHUW\ EURDGHQV QRUPV
UHJDUGLQJODERUH[SURSULDWLRQ,IWKHQODERULVSURSHUW\WKHQWKHODERURI
VODYHV ZDV DOVR SURSHUW\ 7KH IRUFHG H[WUDFWLRQ RU WKHIW  RI WKH ODERU RI
VODYHVWKHUHIRUHIXQFWLRQHGDVDSURSHUW\ORVV$VDQXQFRPSHQVDWHGSURS
HUW\ORVVWKLVH[WUDFWLRQYLRODWHGWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQ¶V7DNLQJV&ODXVH  6LQFH
WKH VWDWH FROODERUDWHG LQ LWV H[SURSULDWLRQ WKLV FRQILVFDWLRQ GHPDQGV VWDWH
UHGUHVV 

 In re %R\FH  3   1HY   ³>/@DERU WKH SRRU PDQ¶V SDWULPRQ\ WKH FUHDWRU RI
ZHDOWKDQGXSRQZKLFKDOOPXVWGHSHQGIRUVXVWHQDQFHLVWKHKLJKHVWVSHFLHVRISURSHUW\´ 6WDWH
Y 3HWHUV2KLR13 16    ³/DERULVSURSHUW\DQGLWPD\EHDQGRIWHQLVWKHRQO\
FRPPRGLW\WKDWWKHZRUNPDQKDVWRVHOO´ 
 ,QIRUH[DPSOH&DOLIRUQLD¶V3HQDO&RGHZDVDPHQGHGWRLQFOXGHWKHH[WUDFWLRQRIODERU
³E\ DQ\ IDOVH RU IUDXGXOHQW UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ RU SUHWHQVH´ LQ WKH VWDWH¶V GHILQLWLRQ RI WKH FULPH RI WKHIW
&$/ 3(1$/&2'(  D  :HVW 
 7KHFRXUWVKDYHDOVRPDLQWDLQHGWKDWODERULVERWKFRQVWLWXWLYHRIDQGFUHDWHVSURSHUW\See,
e.g. 6%XV/LQHVY$PDOJDPDWHG$VV¶QRI6W(OHF5\ 0RWRU&RDFK(PSRI$P0LVV
   ³:HDUHRIWKHILUPFRQYLFWLRQWKDWXQGHUWKHODZ/LEHUW\LQFOXGHVWKHULJKWWRPDNHDQG
HQIRUFH FRQWUDFWV EHFDXVH WKH ULJKW WR PDNH DQG HQIRUFH FRQWUDFWV LV LQFOXGHG LQ WKH ULJKW WR DFTXLUH
SURSHUW\ /DERULVSURSHUW\´ %D\RQQH7H[WLOH&RUSY$P)HGRI6LON:RUNHUV1-(T
 &K modified1-(T   ³/DERULVSURSHUW\FDSLWDOLVSURSHUW\ERWKPXVWEH
HTXDOO\VDIHJXDUGHG´ %UDQVRQY,QGXV:RUNHUVRIWKH:RUOG1HY   ³7KHULJKW
WRODERULVSURSHUW\´ 0DWKHZVY3HRSOH,OO   ³/DERULVSURSHUW\´ : $WO5
&RY%LVKRS*D   ³/DERULVSURSHUW\´ %XWOHUY3HUU\86
  ³>)@RUVRPHSXUSRVHVODERUPXVWEHFRQVLGHUHGDVSURSHUW\´ 6ODXJKWHU+RXVH&DVHV86
   %UDGOH\-GLVVHQWLQJ  ³3URSHUW\LVHYHU\WKLQJZKLFKKDVDQH[FKDQJHDEOHYDOXHDQG
WKH ULJKW RI SURSHUW\ LQFOXGHV WKH SRZHU WR GLVSRVH RI LW DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH ZLOO RI WKH RZQHU /DERU LV
SURSHUW\DQGDVVXFKPHULWVSURWHFWLRQ´ 8QLWHG6WDWHVY7KRPSVRQ)G± WK&LU
  FRQFOXGLQJWKDWIRUWKHSXUSRVHVRIDFULPLQDOSURVHFXWLRQIRUH[WRUWLRQXQGHUWKH+REEV$FWD
SHUVRQ¶VODERUZDVSURSHUW\FDSDEOHRIEHLQJH[WRUWHG 5LWFKLHY3HRSOH,OO   ³/D
ERULVSURSHUW\DQGWKHODERUHUKDVWKHVDPHULJKWWRVHOOKLVODERUDQGWRFRQWUDFWZLWKUHIHUHQFHWKHUH
WRDVKDVDQ\RWKHUSURSHUW\RZQHU´ 
 See -RKQ$FHYHGRDignity Takings in the Criminal Law of Seventeenth-Century England and
the Massachusetts Bay Colony&+,.(17 / 5(9  &LWHUDsupraQRWHDW ³/DERU
LVSURSHUW\DQGDVVXFKPHULWVSURWHFWLRQ´  Laws Regulating Hours of Labor of Minors and Women
<$/( /-   ³/DERULVSURSHUW\´ 
 See .DLPLSRQR 'DYLG :HQJHU Slavery as a Takings Clause Violation  $0 8 / 5(9
    QRWLQJ WKDW WKH FRQILVFDWLRQ RI HQVODYHG ODERU ³UHVXOWHG LQ D SK\VLFDO WDNLQJ WKDW LV
UHPRYDORIHIIHFWLYHWLWOHWRSURSHUW\´ 
 6FKRODUV RI UHSDUDWLRQV GLVDJUHH RQ ZKHWKHU WKLV LV D PRUDO RU OHJDO GXW\ Compare 'DYLG
/\RQV Corrective Justice, Equal Opportunity, and the Legacy of Slavery and Jim Crow  %8 /
5(9   ³>7@KHIHGHUDOJRYHUQPHQWLVPRUDOO\DFFRXQWDEOHIRULWVVXSSRUWRIDGHHSO\
HQWUHQFKHGUDFLDOKLHUDUFK\DQGLWVIDLOXUHWRUHSDLUWKHFRQVHTXHQFHVRIVODYHU\DQG-LP&URZ´  and
$OIUHG/%URSK\Reparations Talk: Reparations for Slavery and the Tort Law Analogy %& 7+,5'
:25/' /-   with $\HVKD%HOO+DUGDZD\The Breach of the Common Law Trust Relation-
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This duty to redress is heightened when the original holders of the
property are enslaved persons deemed to be inferior “sub persons.” 32 Sub
persons are both dehumanized and infantilized by, and within, the polity;33
in the Kantian philosophical tradition, such persons are less (or not at all)
deserving of ethical treatment. In the context of American chattel slavery,
the loss of dignity occasioned by enslavement was catastrophic. As a dignity denial, this extraction served to further instantiate the legal, economic,
and social subordination of people of native and African descent in the
U.S. 34
Property confiscation and theft that targets sub persons entails more
than mere loss of property; dignity itself is impaired. As Atuahene argues,
the resultant dignity taking “involves involuntary property loss accompanied by dehumanization or infantilization.” 35 As defined by Atuahene in
her 2016 article, dignity takings require four elements: (1) direct or indirect
execution by the state; (2) destruction or confiscation of property; (3) from
owners or occupiers; (4) where the intended or unintended result is dehumanization or infantilization. 36
The property loss inhering in chattel slavery directly implicates the authority and power of the state. As a system of domination, slavery places
the labor (and by extension, the body) of the enslaved within the power of
the enslaver. 37 In the U.S. context, positive law provided the scaffolding for
this domination, namely by excluding enslaved men and women from the
category of property rights claimants. 38 The state’s complicity in this sysship Between the United States and African Americans: A Substantive Right to Reparations, 39 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 525 (2015).
32. BERNADETTE ATUAHENE, WE WANT WHAT’S OURS: LEARNING FROM SOUTH AFRICA’S
LAND RESTITUTION PROGRAM 3 (2014).
33. Id. at 12 (“[T]he dispossessions in South Africa were part of a larger strategy that dehumanized and infantilized blacks—they were dignity takings.”).
34. See CHARLES W. MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT 11 (1997) (defining the “racial contract” as
the universe of agreements between and among those considered “white” to subordinate, exploit, and
deny opportunities to nonwhites).
35. Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration, supra note 11, at 800.
36. ATUAHENE, supra note 32, at 26–34
37. See generally ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH (1982).
38. See, e.g., Sanders v. Devereux, 25 Tex. Supp. 1, 11 (1860) (“The right of private property
belongs, in this country, exclusively to freemen. The slave is denied this right as completely as he is the
right of personal liberty. His person and his time being entirely the property of his master, whatever he
may accumulate by his own labor, or may otherwise acquire, becomes immediately the property of his
master . . . .”); In re Bodine’s Will, 34 Ky. 476, 477 (1836) (“Slaves are considered as property; the
privilege of asserting rights, by judicial proceedings, is not, in general, conceded to them . . . . And
therefore, the general rule is, and upon reasons of state, must be, that a slave can neither sue nor be
sued.”); Poydras v. Mourain, 9 La. 492, 505 (1836) (“So far as regards the slaves, the power of the
master is indeed absolute. The slave cannot resist, or be heard if he complain of the abuse of this power.”); Matilda v. Crenshaw, 12 Tenn. 299, 303 (1833) (“That the slave cannot sue the master is a general
rule.”).
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tem was material and critical. 39 In the U.S., federal, state and local governments owned, leased, and sold slaves. 40 Similarly, public law enforcement personnel from federal marshals to local sheriffs hunted, returned,
and “correct[ed]” suspected fugitive slaves. 41 Put simply, the “government
intervened in the master-slave relationship” with regularity. 42 As
Kaimipono David Wenger argues, “[t]he express language of the Fugitive
Slave Clause—that slaves from each state were held ‘under the Laws
thereof’—underscores that slavery was a creature of law and regulation,
imposed over a baseline of freedom for all persons.” 43 This direct involvement of every level of American government in chattel slavery renders
public the institution’s harms, including the confiscation (theft) of labor. 44
Moreover, American chattel slavery hinged upon this state-sanctioned
systematic dehumanization of enslaved persons. As Saidiya Hartman points
out, the violence and terror visited upon enslaved persons was both routine
and extraordinary. 45 Slaveholders killed and maimed their human property
with impunity. 46 This quotidian process of dehumanization and terrorism
relied upon and reinforced the sub person status of the enslaved. This phenomenon was simultaneously both race-based and status-based, as both
enslaved and free people of African descent fell vulnerable to its logic.

39. Brophy, supra note 31, at 121 (“The states established the legal framework that permitted the
exploitation of African Americans. They established laws with the understanding that particular people
would be enslaved, separated from their families, denied education—just about everything that can be
done to destroy a person’s humanity was contemplated or mandated by the laws of the slave states.”).
40. See Wenger, supra note 30, at 220 (“Government actors conducted a large percentage of slave
auctions, allowing neutral devices such as probate and the seizure of debtors’ assets to become part of
the slave trade.”).
41. See Taja-Nia Y. Henderson, Property, Penalty, and (Racial) Profiling, 12 STAN. J. C.R. &
C.L. 177, 179 (2016) (“As local law functionaries—constables, sheriffs, and jailors—systematized
slave discipline, detention, rendition, and sale under the auspices of public authority, an administrative and legal regime emerged whereby putative slaveowners called upon the state to secure, return,
‘correct,’ and sell private property in persons.”).
42. PHILIP J. SCHWARZ, SLAVE LAWS IN VIRGINIA 11 (1996); see also Henderson, supra note 41,
at 178 (2016) (“Slaveholders routinely called upon local law enforcement personnel to assist with
maintaining ‘the most rigid discipline’ among slaves.”).
43. Wenger, supra note 30, at 220–21.
44. See David Lyons, Reparations and Equal Opportunity, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 177, 182
(2004) (arguing that slavery and Jim Crow “were in large part public, not private wrongs”).
45. See SAIDIYA V. HARTMAN, SCENES OF SUBJECTION: TERROR, SLAVERY, AND SELF-MAKING
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 4 (1997) (describing the “terror of the mundane and quotidian”).
46. Colonial Virginia and South Carolina, for example, enacted laws absolving owners from any
criminal liability for killing or maiming a slave where the death was associated with discipline or
“correction.” See, e.g., An Act for the Better Ordering of Slaves, No. 57 S.C. Stat. 343 (1690), reprinted
in THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 343 (David J. McCord ed., 1840). Virginia similarly
“excus[ed] slave killings caused accidentally while ‘correcting’ them.” Alexander A. Reinert, Reconceptualizing the Eighth Amendment: Slaves, Prisoners, and “Cruel and Unusual” Punishment, 94 N.C.
L. REV. 817, 835 (2016).
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III. SLAVERY’S DEMISE AND THE COMING OF RECONSTRUCTION
The preceding Part argues that the theft of labor intrinsic to the institution of chattel slavery in the U.S. satisfies Atuahene’s theoretical framework for dignity takings. In this Section, I provide a brief timeline of
federal policy towards the formerly enslaved in the years following emancipation. The efforts of the Reconstruction-era Congress to bestow legal
personhood to the formerly enslaved—as articulated in the Thirteenth
Amendment, successive Freedmen’s Bureau bills, and the Civil Rights Act
of 1866—had clear dignity restoration effects.
A. The Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
Ratified in December 1865, 47 the Thirteenth Amendment abolished
slavery and involuntary servitude in the U.S., “except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.” 48 The Amendment’s sphere of protection extended (and extends), however, beyond human bondage. As tenBroek observed, the Amendment’s framers entrusted
Congress, specifically, with a “constitutional mandate to enforce . . . not
just the liberty of blacks but the liberty of the whites as well and included
not just freedom from personal bondage but protection in a wide range of
natural and constitutional rights.” 49 Section 2 of the Amendment specifically “authorizes Congress to enforce that promise and create rights of belonging—rights that promote an inclusive vision of who belongs to the national
community of the United States and facilitate equal membership in that
community.” 50
This anti-subordination ethos functions to bestow a baseline quantum
of constitutional dignity upon the populace. In recognition of this function,
the Amendment has been construed by the Supreme Court to ensure protection for all persons from the “badges and incidents of slavery.” 51 The twin
concepts of inclusion and dignity are key to this guarantee: “[A victim]
need only be suffering today under conditions that could reasonably be
called symptoms of a slave society, inability to raise a family with dignity
47. Proclamation No. 52, William H. Seward, Secretary of State, 13 Stat. 774, 775 (Dec. 18,
1865).
48. U.S. CONST. art. XIII.
49. Jacobus tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: Consummation to Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CAL. L. REV. 171, 183 (1951).
50. Rebecca E. Zeitlow, Free at Last! Anti-Subordination and the Thirteenth Amendment, 90
B.U. L. REV. 255, 258 (2009).
51. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883). See generally Jennifer Mason McAward,
Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 561 (2012).
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caused by unemployment, poor schools and housing, and a lack of place in
the body politic.” 52
B. The Freedmen’s Bureau Acts 53
The first Freedmen’s Bureau Act, passed in March 1865, established
the Bureau as an agency within the War Department, and authorized its
operation for a single year. 54 The statute authorized the Secretary of War to
“direct such issues of provisions, clothing, and fuel, as he may deem needful” for the temporary benefit of “destitute and suffering” freedpeople and
refugees. 55 Property redistribution was written into the text of the first
Freedmen’s Bureau Act: Section 4 of the statute authorized the Bureau
commissioner to “set apart” for lease up to forty acres of abandoned and
confiscated lands for “loyal refugees and freedmen.” 56
A Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, which purported to extend the authorization for the Bureau beyond the single year provided for in the earlier
bill, was vetoed by Andrew Johnson. 57 Congress overrode the president’s
veto on July 16, 1866, thereby extending the agency’s work for an additional two years. This bill had included similar provisions for land redistribution; however, instead of planning to redistribute confiscated
Confederate lands to the refugees and freedmen, this bill targeted only “unoccupied public lands.” 58
The Second Freedmen’s Bureau Act included express language authorizing the Commissioner to “provide or cause to be erected suitable
buildings for asylums and schools.” 59 The Freedmen’s Bureau bills also
52. Note, Jones v. Mayer: The Thirteenth Amendment and the Federal Anti-Discrimination Law,
69 COLUM. L. REV. 1019, 1026 (1969).
53. See generally BRUCE FROHNER, THE AMERICAN NATION: PRIMARY SOURCES (2008) (reproducing the Original Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, March 3, 1865; the Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill,
December 4, 1865; and the First Reconstruction Act, establishing military districts throughout former
Confederacy, March 2, 1867)).
54. Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1865, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507, 507 (1865) (“That there is hereby
established in the War Department, to continue during the present war of rebellion, and for one year
thereafter, a bureau of refugees, freedmen, and abandoned lands . . . .”). Congress clearly expected the
Bureau’s to have a limited lifespan. In addition to its single year authorization, the legislation included
no budget appropriation for the new agency. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877, at 69 (1988).
55. Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1865, ch. 90, 13 Stat. at 508.
56. See id.
57. An Act to Enlarge Powers of the Freedmen’s Bureau, S. 60, 39th Cong. (1866) (“That the act
to establish a Bureau for the relief of Freedmen and Refugees . . . shall continue in force until otherwise
provided by law . . . .”); see FONER, supra note 54, at 247 (noting that Johnson ultimately vetoed the
Freedmen’s Bureau Bill of 1866).
58. S. 60 §4.
59. Id.
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provided that the rights enumerated therein (including the right to hold
property, give evidence, and bear arms) could be enforced in speciallyconvened military courts (as opposed to local civil or criminal courts,
which were believed to be hostile to enforcing any newly-bestowed
“rights” upon the former slaves).
C. The Civil Rights Act of 1866
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 declared that people born in the U.S. and
not subject to any foreign power were entitled to be citizens, without regard
to race, color, or (critically) previous condition of slavery or servitude. 60
The Act also proclaimed that any citizen, as so defined, had the same rights
as white citizens to make and enforce contracts, sue and be sued, give evidence in court, and inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property. 61 Additionally, the Act guaranteed to all citizens the
“full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and . . . like punishment,
pains, and penalties . . . .” 62 Persons found to have deprived citizens of
these civil rights were to be “deemed guilty of a misdemeanor” crime. 63
At least with respect to its provisions regarding citizenship, the 1866
Civil Rights Act paralleled and presaged Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. New York Congressman Henry Raymond praised the Act as
“one of the most important bills ever presented to this House for its action.”
President Andrew Johnson found the bill so broad that he vetoed it (although Congress would later override the President’s veto, firing the opening salvo in the conflicts between the President and Congress and ushering
in the period of broad-based remedial and punitive legislative enactments
that came to be known as Radical Republicanism).
IV. THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU AND DIGNITY CONTRADICTIONS
With field agents posted throughout the South, bringing the spectre of
federal authority to the most remote rural areas, the Freedmen’s Bureau
arguably had a greater impact on the day-to-day lived experiences of formerly enslaved persons than either the Thirteenth Amendment or the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. The Bureau’s primary responsibility was “promoting
60. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
1982, 1987–88, 1991–92 (2016)).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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the welfare of the freedmen” through food and cloth relief rations, 64 transportation subsidies, mediation and arbitration of wage disputes between
freedpeople and planters, and overseeing the establishment of schools. 65
The Bureau provided support for the reunification of forcibly displaced
black families in the region, 66 and also adjudicated civil and criminal complaints of freedmen (against both black and white defendants). 67 In this
work, the Bureau was central to the bestowing of dignity upon the formerly
enslaved. In some areas, Bureau agents were even the first public officials
to announce the coming of freedom. 68 As a former slave from Burke County, Georgia recounted:
When freedom was declared, I went down to Augusta to de Freedman’s
Bureau to see if ‘twas true, we was free . . . . De man got up and stated to
de people: ‘You all is just as free as I am. You ain’t got no mistis [sic]
and no master. Work when you want.’ 69

In 1870, in his New Era newspaper, Frederick Douglass editorialized
the Bureau as “the first friend of the freedmen, as their champion and defender under military rule, and after the re-establishment of civil authority,
as their advocate.” 70
A. “The First Friend of the Freedmen” 71: The Bureau’s AntiWhipping Campaign

64. Between 1865 and 1869, the Bureau issued a total of 20,135,930 rations to freedmen and
refugees throughout the South. See PAUL SKEELS PEIRCE, THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU: A CHAPTER IN
THE HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 98 (1904); see also HOWARD A. WHITE, THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU
IN LOUISIANA 66 (1970) (noting that, in Louisiana, “[r]ations consisted of pork or beef, flour or bread,
corn meal, beans, peas, hominy, sugar, vinegar, candles, soap, salt, and pepper”).
65. MARTIN ABBOTT, THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU IN SOUTH CAROLINA, 1865–1872, at 23–24
(1967).
66. Id. at 50 (noting that, for South Carolina, “perhaps four thousand freedmen and possibly five
hundred whites received free transportation from the Bureau to enable them to return to their original
homes or to go to localities where they could find work”); see also GEORGE R. BENTLEY, A HISTORY
OF THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU 86 (1970) (“Sometimes the Bureau’s officials were able to reunite husbands and wives who had been separated as a result of slave sales, or in the hurried wartime migrations,
and they succeeded in restoring some lost children to their parents.”).
67. See ABBOTT, supra note 65, at 24 (detailing the “endless stream of [freedmen’s] complaints
to be heard, investigated, and acted upon” in South Carolina). See generally BENTLEY, supra note 66, at
152–68 (detailing the efforts of the Bureau to secure civil and criminal justice for freedpeople).
68. Ruby Lorraine Radford, Slavery, in FEDERAL WRITERS’ PROJECT, SLAVE NARRATIVES: A
FOLK HISTORY OF SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES FROM INTERVIEWS WITH FORMER SLAVES 309, 347
(1941) (“The Freedmen’s Bureau in Augusta gave out the news officially to the negroes . . . .”).
69. SMITH, supra note 16, at 26–27 (citation omitted).
70. Review of the Work of the Freeemen’s [sic] Bureau, NEW ERA (Washington, D.C.), Jan. 20,
1870, reprinted in SMITH, supra note 16, at 63.
71. Id.
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In its role as “first friend” and as the mediator and arbitrator of labor
disputes, the Bureau earned the ire of the planter class. In testimony before
Congress, black politician Oscar J. Dunn testified that because of its work,
“[t]he Freedman’s Bureau is a great eyesore to the planters; they do not like
it at all.” 72 The planters’ critique was attributable in part to the Bureau’s
efforts to “end a lingering vestige of slavery—the whipping of blacks.” 73 In
the minds of planters, the Bureau’s anti-whipping campaign interfered with
their ability to “correct” or “discipline” the black workforce. 74 Prior to
emancipation, slaveholders had relied upon the spectacle of targeted brutality against individual slaves to instill terror and exact discipline among
other slaves. 75 The Bureau’s interference with this mode of discipline,
therefore, compromised planters’ dominance and authority and threatened
the “well being” of the racial order. 76 When confronted by Bureau agents
over the beating of a black girl in 1866, for example, A.J. White of Covington, Kentucky admitted to the beating, “saying that any person he employed would be corrected when doing wrong.” 77 Another Kentucky
planter insisted to Bureau agents that a woman on his plantation “wants to
be a lady and I can do nothing with her without whipping her.” 78 The
woman’s refusal to submit to the planter’s authority posed a problem larger
than simply recalcitrance; in his estimation, whipping her was “necessary
for the well being of his plantation.” 79
In an effort to counteract planter resistance to the Bureau’s “free labor” modes of labor discipline, agents throughout the former Confederacy
referred criminal charges to local courts in an attempt to eradicate the whip

72. BACKGROUND FOR RADICAL RECONSTRUCTION: TESTIMONY TAKEN FROM THE HEARINGS OF
THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION, THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE MEMPHIS RIOTS AND
MASSACRES, AND THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE NEW ORLEANS RIOTS, 1866 AND 1867, at 4 (Hans

L. Trefousse ed., 1970).
73. GEORGE C. WRIGHT, RACIAL VIOLENCE IN KENTUCKY 1865–1940: LYNCHINGS, MOB RULE,
AND “LEGAL LYNCHINGS” 24 (1990).
74. SMITH, supra note 16, at 66 (“White farmers and planters complained that the bureau’s rule
against whites whipping blacks denied them an effective means to discipline their workers . . .”).
75. See, e.g., IRA BERLIN ET AL., REMEMBERING SLAVERY: AFRICAN AMERICANS TALK ABOUT
THEIR PERSONAL EXPERIENCES OF SLAVERY AND EMANCIPATION 140, 294 (1996) (transcribing the
testimony of Jordan Johnson wherein he recounted how his owners forced husbands “to stay dere” and
watch their wives being whipped, “not darin’ even look like dey didn’t like it” (dialect in original));
Henderson, supra note 41, at 178 (observing how, in 1819, President James Monroe sought a public
flogging for a recalcitrant slave on the grounds that such spectacles “served as an ‘example’ to others”
(citation omitted)).
76. WRIGHT, supra note 73, at 24.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 25.
79. Id.
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from southern labor relations. 80 In Louisville, for example, Bureau agents
went so far as to arrest white employers accused of using the whip against
their employees. 81 Louisiana Assistant Commissioner Thomas Conway
ordered agents to “[b]e inflexible in your defense of the Freedmen . . . . Arrest, try and punish old slave holders who commit violence
upon the Freedmen.” 82
B. Education, Voting, and Dignity
Central to the Bureau’s work was the establishment of schools for
freed children and adults. As Mark Graber observes, the framers of the
Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill identified education as one of the “central
conditions of freedom and full citizenship” for the formerly enslaved. 83 In
collaboration with Northern benevolent societies, the Bureau leveraged
private and public capital for the construction, staffing, and maintenance of
primary, secondary, and post-secondary schools for freedpeople throughout
the region. 84 In 1867, the Bureau Commissioner reported to Congress that
the agency’s efforts to promote and secure an educational infrastructure for
freedpeople had reached even “the remotest counties of each of the confederate states.” 85
With the passage of the Reconstruction Act of March 2, 1867—and
the extension of the franchise to black men in the South—Bureau agents

80. See, e.g., MARY FARMER-KAISER, FREEDWOMEN AND THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU: RACE,
GENDER, AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE AGE OF EMANCIPATION 78–79 (2010) (collecting reports of
Bureau agents referring cases involving planter violence against freedwomen in Virginia, Mississippi,
Texas, and Georgia).
81. See id. (describing how “[i]n June 1867, [Bureau agents] arrested five whites for beating
blacks and lodged them in the military prison”). The outcomes of such cases are unknown.
82. Conway to L.S. Butler, July 17, 1865, in WHITE, supra note 64, at 135.
83. Mark A. Graber, The Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill’s Constitution, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1361,
1364 (2016) (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 630 (1866) (statement of Rep. Hubbard)
(“Another object is to give them an opportunity to learn to read . . . . They ought not to be left to perish
by the wayside in poverty . . . .”)).
84. See Paul A. Cimbala, Making Good Yankees: The Freedmen’s Bureau and Education in
Reconstruction Georgia, 1865–1870, reprinted in THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU AND BLACK FREEDOM
58Ȃ59 (Donald G. Nieman ed., 1994) (describing sentiments of Gen. Davis Tillson, fist assistant commissioner for Bureau in Georgia, who outlined the Bureau’s policy in the state as “to be the medium of
distributing the charity of benevolent individuals and societies”). For example, thirteen colleges and
universities were founded by the Bureau between 1866 and 1869. See W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE COLLEGEBRED NEGRO 12 (1900) (noting “[t]his group of schools was established directly after the war by
Missionary and Freedmen’s Aid Societies under the protection and for the most part under the direct
patronage of the Freedmen’s Bureau”).
85. Report of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned Lands,
House Exec. Docs., 40th Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 2, Part 1, in WILLIAM H. BURKS, THE FREEDMEN’S
BUREAU, POLITICS, AND STABILITY OPERATIONS DURING RECONSTRUCTION IN THE SOUTH 68 n.31
(M.M.A.S., U.S. Army Command & Gen. Staff Coll. 2009).
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also served as voter registrars. 86 In June 1867, Louisiana Bureau commissioner General Joseph Mower pressed agents “to make every effort for the
instruction of the freedmen in order that they may vote intelligently.” 87
These efforts threatened white political dominance in the state by organizing and protecting ballot access for the formerly enslaved. 88 The agency’s
facilitation of black political participation thus had clear dignity bestowing
properties.
C. The Bureau as Dignity Extraction
In its dual roles as organizer of black labor and “mediator” of labor
disputes, the Bureau pressured black agricultural workers to accept yearlong contracts. As Mary Farmer-Kaiser describes, the Bureau deployed
vagrancy laws to “induce” former slaves into labor contracts:
Thus bureau labor policies ordered, first, that all freedpeople be urged to
find work and make contracts and, second that those who rejected labor
be considered vagrants, fined, imprisoned, and “hired out” to employers
until they understood the virtue of honest toil. 89

Bureau-approved labor contracts often provided that laborers were to
paid at the end of the contract term and tied compensation to the productivity of the crop, thereby limiting mobility and bolstering planters’ authority over workers’ lives. 90
When freedmen and freedwomen resisted Bureau efforts to bind them
to the soil (and their former owners), Bureau agents castigated them for
idleness. John William De Forest, an agent in Greenville, South Carolina,
complained in his memoir that “myriads of women who once earned their
own living now have aspirations to be like white ladies [and] instead of
using the hoe, pass the days in dawdling over their trivial housework, or

86. See SMITH, supra note 16, at 100 (“Throughout the South, agents of the Freedmen’s Bureau
registered black voters.”).
87. WHITE, supra note 64, at 27 n.46 (1970).
88. Id. at 30 (“The New Orleans Picayune complained that the Bureau’s political indoctrination
of freedmen was ‘an element of partisan strength . . . wielded entirely from the North, and a perpetual
source of political weakness’ that rendered the white people politically impotent.”).
89. See SMITH, supra note 16, at 81.
90. Id. at 66 (“[Black farm laborers] complained that this restricted their freedom of movement
and limited their right to take advantage of new economic opportunities.”); see LEON LITWACK, BEEN
IN THE STORM SO LONG: THE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY 284–85, 408–28(1979) (detailing the coercive
measures taken by Bureau agents in an effort to control black labor).
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gossiping with their neighbors.” 91 In Louisiana, the Bureau “arrested and
returned freedmen who had run away in default of their obligations.” 92
Beyond the market distortions occasioned by its insistence upon yearlong contracts, Bureau agents were not unbiased arbiters of labor fairness.
In jurisdictions where local whites were employed as Bureau agents,
freedmen suffered. In Georgia, for example, “many [native white agents]
clearly allied themselves with their white neighbors.” 93 In 1867, for example, the editor of the New Orleans Tribune—a publication that one author
called “the voice of blacks in the lower Mississippi Valley” 94—claimed
that Bureau agents were “prejudiced” and unlikely to mete out “impartial
justice” to the formerly enslaved:
The laborer on the plantations is, to a very great extent, in the clutches of
his employer. Should he be abused or wronged what are the means of redress? Practically he has none. If he goes to the Bureau’s agent, he finds
there an officer who rides with his employer, who dines with him, and
who drinks champaign [sic] with him. 95

Beyond accusations of bias, Bureau agents were also directly implicated in “outrages” against black workers. In Georgia, a Bureau agent hung
a woman “by the thumbs for two hours and a half upon the representation
[of her employer].” 96
The Bureau’s role in land policy concerning the freedpeople was similarly problematic. Although the Bureau also had primary administrative
authority over federal land redistribution policy after 1865, less than one
percent of former Confederate lands were ever vested in the hands of the
agency. 97 The Bureau’s inability to provide a secure path to landownership
exacerbated regional economic disruptions and left the former slaves with
“few alternatives to working for white landowners.” 98

91. FARMER-KAISER, supra note 80, at 83 (citation omitted).
92. WHITE, supra note 64, at 122.
93. DONALD G. NIEMAN, TO SET THE LAW IN MOTION: THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU AND THE
LEGAL RIGHTS OF BLACKS, 1865–1868, at 27 (1979).
94. SMITH, supra note 16, at 99.
95. Justice for All, TRIBUNE (New Orleans, La.), Oct. 31, 1867, at 1, reprinted in SMITH, supra
note 16, at 74–75.
96. FARMER-KAISER, supra note 80, at 80. Reporting on a Georgia freedmen’s convention in
1866, a Bureau official described that, at the hands of Bureau agents, “both men and women have been
tied up by the thumbs for five hours.” NIEMAN, supra note 93, at 27 (citation omitted).
97. PAUL SKEELS PEIRCE, THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU: A CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF
RECONSTRUCTION 129–30 (1904).
98. Donald G. Nieman, Introduction to THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU AND BLACK FREEDOM, supra
note 85, at ix.
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Crafted in response to the “problem” of enslaved men and women
seeking freedom behind Union lines, the Confiscation Act of 1861 declared
all property “used for insurrectionary purposes” to be “the lawful subject of
prize and capture” subject to seizure and conversion by the federal government. 99 Notwithstanding the statute’s breadth, President Abraham Lincoln declined to pursue large-scale land confiscations, thereby hindering
future efforts to redistribute such property to the freedpeople. 100 The Second Confiscation Act of 1862 similarly provided that confiscated lands “be
condemned as enemies’ property and become the property of the United
States,” and included explicit grants of freedom to those enslaved men and
women either belonging to specified classes of persons-in-rebellion, 101
captured by Union forces, 102 or those fleeing to or living in areas under the
control of Union forces. 103 By its text, the Second Confiscation Act provided the statutory basis for large-scale seizures and redistribution of land to
the freedpeople, and throughout the South, land trickled into the possession
of former slaves. Federal military forces also executed on tax debts in regions under Union control. In the South Carolina Sea Islands, for example,
“the federal courts seized 76,775 acres of land for non-payment of the direct tax,” and subsequently made the land available for sale to black heads
of households. 104 In 1862, General Benjamin Butler “established a system
for leasing plantations and paying wages to former slaves” in Louisiana
under the auspices of a sub-agency of the Department of the Gulf. 105 In
1864, General Ulysses S. Grant organized a communitarian community of
black farmers on lands formerly owned by Jefferson Davis and his brother. 106 Instead of ushering in a radical redistribution of land to the region’s
freedpeople, however, these “rehearsals for reconstruction” were frustrated
as “military necessity began to siphon away black farm workers.” 107 Even
General Sherman’s Special Field Order No. 15—which purported to “reserve[] and set apart” land in the Georgia and South Carolina Sea Islands

99. 12 Stat. 319 (1861).
100. See CLAUDE F. OUBRE, FORTY ACRES AND A MULE: THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU AND BLACK
LAND OWNERSHIP 2 (1978) (“Lincoln interpreted the [first Confiscation Act] conservatively.”).
101. Confiscation Acts, ch. 195, § 5, 12 Stat. 589 (1862).
102. Id. § 9.
103. Id.
104. See OUBRE, supra note 100, at 8–11.
105. See id. at 13 n.28 (“In the Department of the Gulf the military agency assigned to provide for
the freedmen was initially called the Freedmen’s Bureau (not to be confused with the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, which was not created until March, 1865).”).
106. See id. at 16–17.
107. Aviam Soifer, Status, Contract, and Promises Unkept, 96 YALE L.J. 1916, 1935, 1935 n.68
(citing the settlement of former slaves on lands in the South Carolina Sea Islands)
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“for the settlement of the negroes” 108—failed to secure permanent property
rights to the 40,000 resettled freedpeople: Five months later, Confederate
owners of those lands, with presidential pardons in hand, returned to their
estates to assert rights to which the Bureau acquiesced. 109 Freedpeople
recognized this expropriation of their possessory rights to land in favor of
their former enslavers as a dignitary harm:
We were promised homesteads by the government. If it does not carry
out the promises its agents made to us . . . we are left in a more unpleasant condition than our former . . . You will see this is not the condition of
really free men. You ask us to forgive the landowners of our island . . .
The man who tied me to a tree and gave me 39 lashes; who stripped and
flogged my mother & sister & who will not let me stay in his empty hut
except I will do his planting & be satisfied with his price & who combines with others to keep away land from me, well knowing I would not
have anything to do with him if I had land of my own—that man, I cannot well forgive. 110

Land ownership was central to the former slaves’ conception of freedom. 111
As one author described the Bureau’s conundrum surrounding land,
“land distribution, however, because of jurisdictional disputes and divided
authority, proved to be the most perplexing of the [Bureau’s] economic
problems.” 112 Ultimately, as a result, the Bureau was ill-equipped to effec-

108. William Tecumseh Sherman, Special Field Order No. 15: “Forty Acres and a Mule” (Jan. 16,
1865), reprinted in WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH: THE CONTROVERSY OVER APOLOGIES AND
REPARATIONS FOR HUMAN INJUSTICE 365, 365–66 (Roy L. Brooks ed., 1999).
109. See OUBRE, supra note 95, at 49 (noting how, in September 1865, having received presidential pardons, “the former owners of land within the Sherman reservation . . . demanded that their lands
be restored to them”); Special Field Orders No. 3 (Feb. 14, 1866), in S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 39-6, at 53-54
(1867); Report of R.K. Scott to Maj. Gen. O. O. Howard, Commissioner (Nov. 1, 1866), in S. EXEC.
DOC. NO. 39-6, at 114. Similar restoration efforts occurred throughout the former Confederacy. See
OUBRE, supra note 95, at 24–25 (describing the restoration of land to Confederate owners in South
Carolina, Georgia, and Virginia).
110. Registers and Letters Received, Selected Series of Records, Record Group 105, Bureau of
Refugees, Freedmen & Abandoned Lands, microformed on M752, Roll 19, 839–41 (National Archives), reprinted in OUBRE, supra note 95, at 53.
111. See also Paul A. Cimbala, A Black Colony in Dougherty County: The Freedmen’s Bureau and
the Failure of Reconstruction in Southwest Georgia, 4 J. SW. GA. HIST. 72, 73 (1986) (“As Capt. A. P.
Ketchum, a bureau officer and long-time sea island veteran, concluded at the end of Reconstruction’s
first summer, ‘the negro regards the ownership of land as a privilege that ought to be co-existent with
his freedom.’” (citation omitted)).
112. OUBRE, supra note 100, at 23; see also id. at 67 (“Some bureau officers helped the freedmen
in every way possible to secure land immediately, while others, who were equally concerned about the
welfare of the freedmen, preferred to establish them as workers until they had sufficient financial
resources to become successful landowners.”).
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tuate large-scale land redistribution. 113 As one historian of the agency observed:
[T]he amount of land in the control of the bureau was relatively small.
Only two-tenths of one per cent of the land in the insurrectionary states
was ever held by the bureau. It would have been impossible to give even
one acre to each family of freedmen. 114

President Johnson’s amnesty and restoration policies further frustrated
the ability of the Bureau to permanently transform the freedpeople into a
landholding class. 115 This entrenched landlessness stymied black selfdetermination in the region and limited the economic mobility of those who
had previously been promised “dignity” and “citizenship.”116
V. CONCLUSION
The Bureau was not the only arm of the federal government engaged
in this dignitary give-and-take. Occupying federal military forces also
worked to bestow and extract dignity and property from the formerly enslaved. As one Roanoke freedman noted in an 1865 petition to President
Lincoln: “[T]hose head men have done every thing to us that our masters
have done except by [sic] and sell us and now they are trying to starve the
women and children to death cutting off they ration . . . .” 117 The same
petition further claimed that, in addition to “trying to starve” the freed people, military officials were also conscripting black children into labor without their parents’ consent: “[They] send them to Newbern to work to pay
for they ration without they parent consint . . . . Some of these little
ones . . . . Wasen oer 12 years old.” 118 A petition by Louisiana freedmen
protesting the mobilization of black labor by the Department of the Gulf
under the leadership of General Nathaniel P. Banks similarly contended
that Banks’s labor system “does not pratically [sic] differ from slavery,
113. The Bureau did have some success with resettling freedpeople on condemned lands. In Beaufort County, South Carolina, under the leadership of black Bureau agent Martin R. Delaney, freedpeople purchased “the entire county of Beaufort, with the exception of the plantations bought by
northerners at tax sales during the war.” OUBRE, supra note 100 at 69–70.
114. PEIRCE, supra note 97, at 129–30 (1904).
115. Id.; see also OUBRE, supra note 100, at 35, 35–45. (describing how President Johnson “gradually forced restoration of much of the property”).
116. See NIEMAN, supra note 93 at 221–22 (“Because the Bureau had lacked the ability to provide
freedmen with land, blacks had no choice but to work as agricultural laborers, and consequently, they
remained highly vulnerable to control by white landowners.”).
117. Letter from the Colored Men of Roanoke Island, N.C. (Mar. 9, 1865), in FREE AT LAST: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF SLAVERY, FREEDOM, AND THE CIVIL WAR 222, 224 (Ira Berlin & Barbara
J. Fields eds., 1992).
118. Id. at 225–26 (dialect in original).



CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

>9RO

H[FHSW E\ WKH LQWHUGLFWLRQ IURP VHOOLQJ DQG ZKLSSLQJ WR GHDWK WKH ODERU
HUV´
,QFRPSDWLEOHFRQIOLFWLQJDQGSROLWLFDOO\XQSRSXODUSROLF\JRDOVFRP
SRXQGHG WR IUXVWUDWH WKH HIIRUWV RI WKH )UHHGPHQ¶V %XUHDX WR JXDUDQWHH
EODFN SROLWLFDO ULJKWV ZKLOH OLPLWLQJ WKH DJHQF\¶V DELOLW\ WR SHUPDQHQWO\
LQVWDQWLDWH WKH ³EDGJHV DQG LQFLGHQWV´ RI IUHHGRP XSRQ WKH IRUPHUO\ HQ
VODYHG ,Q WKH ZDNH RI DQ HPDQFLSDWLRQ PRWLYDWHG E\ ZDU DQG D UHHOLQJ
UHJLRQDOHFRQRP\VWLOOGHVSHUDWHIRUFKHDSODERUWKHSURPLVHRIWKH)UHHG
PDQ¶V%XUHDXWRUHVWRUHSURSULHWDU\RUSROLWLFDOGLJQLW\WRWKHIUHHGSHRSOH
ZDV OLPLWHG +LVWRULDQ'RQDOG*1LHPDQDVNV³:KRVH%XUHDXZDVLW
WKHQWKHIUHHGPHQ¶VRUWKHSODQWHUV"´
7KH DYDLODELOLW\ DQG VFRSH RI GLJQLW\ UHVWRUDWLRQ LV QHFHVVDULO\ FRQ
VWUDLQHGE\IRUFHVERWKZLWKLQDQGH[WHUQDOWRDSROLW\$V$WXDKHQHDUJXHV
WKH UHPHGLDO UHSDUDWLRQV LQKHULQJ LQ GLJQLW\ UHVWRUDWLRQ UHTXLUH DW EDVH
SROLWLFDOZLOO:KHQVXFKZLOOLVDEVHQWRUZKHQWKHGLVSRVVHVVHGUHPDLQD
SROLWLFDORUHFRQRPLFXQGHUFODVVFRPSHQVDWLRQDORQHKDVOLPLWHGFDSDFLW\
WRUHVWRUHVWROHQGLJQLW\,QVWHDGRIWKH³VOLGLQJVFDOH´RIGLJQLW\UHVWRUDWLRQ
FRQWHPSODWHGE\$OIUHG%URSK\LQKLVDUWLFOHRQWKH7XOVD5DFH5L
RWVWKLV(VVD\VXJJHVWVWKDWMXVWLFHDVUHVWRUDWLRQPD\EHPRUHRIDmoving target7KHFRQWUDGLFWLRQVLQKHULQJLQ86IHGHUDOSROLF\WRZDUGEODFNV
LQWKHLPPHGLDWHZDNHRIWKH&LYLO:DUDQGHPDQFLSDWLRQOD\EDUHWKHOLP
LWVRIGLJQLWDU\SURSHUW\UHVWRUDWLRQWRHIIHFWXDWHIUHHGRPDQGFLWL]HQVKLS
$WXDKHQH¶VZRUNLQYLWHVXVWRFRQWLQXHWRFRQVLGHUVHULRXVO\WKHFRQGLWLRQV
FLUFXPVWDQFHV DQG FULWHULD IRU UHSDUDWLYH UHPHGLHV LQ WKH IDFH RI VXFK
VHHPLQJO\LQWUDFWDEOH DQGSHUVLVWHQW KDUPV
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